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This paper exploits responses on the stated preferences for public sector 
jobs among a sample of unemployed in Pakistan to inform on the existence of 
public sector job queues. The empirical approach allowed job preference to 
influence unemployment duration. The potential wage advantage an 
unemployed individual would enjoy in a public sector job was found to exert no 
independent influence on the stated preference indicating that fringe benefits and 
work conditions are perhaps more important considerations.  The stated 
preference for a public sector job was found to be associated with higher 
uncompleted durations.  The estimated effect suggests that, on average and 
controlling for education and other characteristics, those unemployed who stated 
a preference for public sector jobs had higher uncompleted durations of between 
four and six months.  This finding was taken to confirm that there are long 
queues for public sector jobs in Pakistan. 
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The existence of sizeable reward differentials between the two sectors 
ensure that public sector jobs are coveted in many developing economies, and 
particularly so by the more educated [see Blaug (1979)].  This can give rise to 
job queues and  wait  unemployment given risk-averse agents’ preferences for 
stable and well paid public sector jobs.  Although it is possible to interpret wait 
unemployment or queuing as part of an optimal job search strategy, there may 
be sizeable private and social opportunity costs associated with such behaviour.                
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between public 
sector job preferences, as expressed by unemployed individuals and their 
unemployment duration in Pakistan. The data used in our analysis are drawn 
from the Pakistan Labour Force Survey of 2001-02.  Since the early 1990s the 
government of Pakistan has been committed to the implementation of a set of 
deregulation and liberalisation policies, which  incorporates some degree of 
down-sizing in the public sector. However, public sector employment still 
comprises over one-half of all wage employment in Pakistan and, in spite of the 
re-orientation of the economy towards the private sector in recent years,  the 
competition for employment in the public sector remains keen. Public sector 
employment in Pakistan is still viewed as attractive because of better pay, better 
work conditions, and the availability of an array of fringe benefits (e.g., pension 
rights and free medical benefits).
1    
This study attempts to examine the existence of a job queue through 
analysing the public sector job preferences of a sample of unemployed 
individuals.   The primary objective of this paper is an examination of the 
relationship between public sector job preferences and an individual’s duration 
of unemployment.
2  Our modelling approach is to treat the public sector job 
stated preference as a function of, inter alia, the public-private wage gap and 
allow job preference to endogenously influence an individual’s unemployment 
duration.  The data section provides a description of the unemployment duration 
measure.      
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1Discussed briefly in  Bilquees (2006).  
2The duration is uncompleted in nature.    2 
SOME BACKGROUND ISSUES 
The earlier studies of Lindauer and Sabot (1983) for Tanzania and Van 
der Gaag and Vijerberg (1988) for Cote D’Ivoire provide mixed evidence on the 
size and direction of the public sector pay gap with the latter study highlighting 
the importance of selection bias in informing any reasonable interpretation.  
Terrell (1993), using data for Haiti, reports a relatively large average public 
sector pay gap with selection bias apparently relevant in only one sector.  Skyt-
Neilsen and Rosholm (2001) detected a positive average ceteris paribus pay gap 
in favour of public sector workers in Zambia but noted that at the upper end of 
the conditional wage distribution it became negative for the highly educated.  
Said (2004), using data for Egypt, found a wage gap in favour of the private 
sector for males which was reversed when wages were replaced by a broader 
compensation measure. Mengistae (1999) detects a sizeable pay gap in the urban 
labour markets of Ethiopia.  Finally, Hyder and Reilly (2005) report a sizeable 
average wage differential in favour of public sector workers in Pakistan.    
The existence of positive differentials in favour of the public sector may 
give rise to job queues and ‘wait’ unemployment.  In addition, the queues may 
also be influenced by the fact that the public sector is generally characterised by 
more favourable work conditions and fringe  benefit provision.  The queuing 
behaviour may be concentrated among particular types of labour market 
participants.  Blaug (1979) noted the prevalence of university graduates among 
the unemployed in the cities of the least developed countries and Upadhyay 
(1994) argues this as a commonly observed phenomenon in the densely 
populated countries of South Asia.  Boudarbat (2005) notes a preference for 
public sector employment in Africa and a willingness among the educated to 
engage in ‘wait’ unemployment to secure the more well paid and stable public 
sector jobs.   
There is a modest empirical literature for developed countries on 
investigating whether a queue actually exists for public sector jobs.  The primary 
motive for testing the existence of queues is that it is taken to provide indirect 
evidence that public sector workers secure higher overall compensation [see 
Gregory and Borland (1999)]. Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit with partial 
observability has been used to provide empirical evidence on the existence of 
public sector job queues [for example, see Abowd and Farber (1982)].  
Mengistae (1999) modifies this approach to examine the evidence for such 
queues in Ethiopia’s urban labour market.     
  
DATA 
This study uses cross-section data drawn from the nationally 
representative Labour Force Survey (LFS) for Pakistan for 2001-02.  The survey 
covers all urban and rural areas of the four provinces of Pakistan as defined by 
the 1998 Population Census. The LFS excludes the  Federally Administered   3 
Tribal Areas (FATA), military restricted areas, and protected areas of the 
NWFP. These exclusions are not seen as significant since they constitute only 
about 3 percent of the total population of Pakistan.  
The sample used for the primary analysis is comprised of 767 individuals 
who gave their status as unemployed but available for work.  Our analysis is 
restricted to those aged between 15 and 60 years of age. Table A-1 of the 
Appendix reports the definitions of the variables used in our analysis.  The 
unemployment duration  variable is interval-coded and an appropriate 
econometric procedure to account for this is discussed in the next section.  The 
public sector job preference variable is constructed from a question which asked 
respondents to state a preference for the type of job for which they are available.  
The relevant categories comprised (i) full-time paid employment with 
government, (ii) full-time paid employment with private business/industry, (iii) 
part-time paid employment, (iv) self-employment given the necessary resources 
and facilities, (v) other type of employment such as commission, contract 
employment, daily wage employment etc.  The public sector job preference was 
constructed as a binary measure with responses to category (i) coded as one, and 
all other responses coded zero.       
Our approach requires estimation of a public/private sector wage 
differential for the unemployed.  In order to do this we estimate for employees 
(using the LFS data) separate log hourly wage equations.
3  The private sector is 
here broadly defined to include workers employed in private limited companies, 
cooperative societies, individual ownership and partnerships. Given the need to 
construct a wage differential for the unemployed, the wage specifications 
include only those variables available for the unemployed group.  Nevertheless, 
the wage specifications are reasonably rich from the perspective of the 
Mincerian tradition and contain age and its quadratic, educational level, whether 
the individual undertook vocational training, marital status, settlement type and 
a set of regional controls.  We believe that the private sector definition we use, 
though not perfect, is sufficiently broad to approximate the pecuniary gains 
associated with the four alternatives expressed under (ii) to (v) above.      
The estimated wage equations were subject to selectivity correction based 
on Lee’s (1980) procedure, and with appropriate instrumentation, yield vectors 
of unbiased wage coefficients for the relevant sectors.
4  These coefficients are 
taken to p rovide the prices that the unemployed would receive for their 
characteristics if selected at random into either the public or the broadly defined 
alternative private sector.  The wage gap is constructed by fitting the wage 
equation coefficients to the relevant characteristics (excluding the selection 
terms) for each individual, and then taking the difference between the two.  This 
                                                 
3The hourly wages expressed in rupees, was calculated by dividing weekly earnings by 
number of hours worked per week. 
4A similar approach was adopted by Gyourko and Tracy (1988).   4 
could be taken to represent for each individual their public/private wage offer 
differential.      
Table A-4 reports the estimates for the hourly wage equations using the 
samples of public and private sector employees.  The estimates are plausible by 
the standards of the empirical wage determination literature and there is 
evidence of selection bias in the private sector equation.
5  The public-private 
sector wage differentials are computed using both uncorrected and selectivity-
corrected OLS estimates.  These are reported in Table A-5 and are separately 
computed using the sample mean characteristics for the public sector workers, 
the private sector workers, and the sample of unemployed.  The estimates 
suggest sizeable and comparable average public-private sector wage gaps for all 
three groups.           
Table A -2 reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 
unemployed and by stated job preference.  The unemployed are generally 
young, male, unmarried with a fifth possessing no formal education.  Over one-
quarter have been unemployed for over a year.  The wage offer differential 
suggests that an average unemployed individual would earn 37 percent more in 
hourly wages if selected into a public sector as compared to a private sector job.  
Of those that express a preference for a public sector job, over one-fifth has a 
university degree and 42 percent have been unemployed for over one year.  In 
contrast, those without such a preference have lower incidence of high duration 
unemployment, are less well educated, and more likely to head a household. The 
pattern evident from an inspection of these raw data is that the more educated 
prefer public sector jobs, and those that prefer public sector jobs have higher 
uncompleted durations.  However, the public wage gap differentials for both 
types of unemployed are broadly comparable.                 
 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our econometric model comprises two equations: a public sector job 
preference equation and an unemployment duration equation.  Assume 
*
1i y  is a 
latent variable that captures an individual’s preference for a public sector job.  It 
is assumed related to a set of explanatory variables ( xi) using the following 
relationship: 
i i u x y + b ¢ = 1
*
1                       where ui ~ N(0,1)  …  …  …  (1) 
The xi vector is assumed to include the individual’s predicted wage offer 
gap between a public and a private sector j ob.  Let y1i denote an observable 
binary variable that conveys information on whether an individual has a 
                                                 
5The instruments for identification of the selection parameters are head of household and 
lived in the district since birth.    5 
preference for a public sector job, which is denoted y1i =1 if this is the case, and 
y1i = 0 if not.  The relationship between the latent variable and the observed 
variable is given by:   y1i =1 if 
*
1i y  > 0, and y1i =0 if 
*
1i y £ 0.  This application can 
be formulated as a simple binary probit model and the specification of the log 
likelihood function is now discussed. 
The above model described in  Equation (1) shows the probability of 
preferring a public sector job is F( x¢b) and independent observations leads to the 
joint probability, or likelihood function, 
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The likelihood function for a sample of n observations can be written as; 
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F(.) represents the commulative distribution function for the standard 
normal.  
The unemployment duration variable is expressed in discrete intervals 
measured in months.  Let 
*
2i y denote an underlying latent dependent variable 
that captures the ith individual’s unemployment duration.  This can be expressed 
as a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables (zi) using the following 
relationship: 
      =
*
2i y i i e z + g ¢                  where ei  ~ N(0, s
2)  …  …  (5) 
It is assumed that 
*
2i y is related to the observable ordinal variable y2i as 
follows: 
y2i  =  0  if  –¥ < 
*
2i y   £  a1 
y2i =  1  if  a1   < 
*
2i y    <  a2 
y2i =  2  if  a2  £ 
*
2i y     <  a3       
y2i =  3  if  a3  £ 
*
2i y     <  a4 
y2i =  4  if  a4  £ 
*
2i y    <  +¥     6 
where the aj are known thresh hold values.  This application can be formulated 
as an interval regression (or grouped dependent variable) model  and the 
specification of the log likelihood function can be written as, 
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Following Stewart (1983), we treat the first and the last intervals as open-ended 
in this case so for j=0, F(aj) = F(–¥) = 0 and for j=4, F(aj) = F(+¥) = 1, where 
F(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimates of wage equation, with and without correction for 
selectivity are reported in Table A-4. For the case of correction of selectivity, 
selection term is estimated based on a five category MNL. The first three 
categories are for employed individuals in the public, private and state owned 
enterprises, fourth category contains unemployed but actively looking for work 
and the last category is consist of unemployed and do not want work at all.
6 The 
multinomial results are given in Table A -6. For the identification between 
sectoral attachment equations and wage equations “head of the household” and 
“time spent in the present district” are not included in the wage equation. The 
purpose of estimating wage equation here is to predict wages for those 
unemployed but looking for work. For this specific purpose only those variables 
are included in the wage equations that also have the information about those 
unemployed individuals looking for work. For example occupational categories 
are not included in the wage equation, as we do not have this information for 
those unemployed.  
Starting with the Table A-4 (wage equations corrected for selection) the 
estimated coefficient for “male” is significant with positive sign when estimated 
without correction for selectivity in both public and private sector. But it is 
lower in magnitude in the private sector and insignificant in public sector. Males 
earn 34.4 percent more then their female counterpart in the private sector. The 
estimated age effect is poorly determined in the public sector and in the private 
sector it is significant and suggests a concave shape. Earnings are maximised at 
58 years of age in the private sector. The educational categories are consistent 
with human capital theory; wage premium is directly proportional to the level of 
                                                 
6Before applying the multinomial logit model to obtain the probabilities for sectoral 
attachment, it is necessary to test the assumptions of the model. The multinomial logit has some 
potential weaknesses; one is that the choices made are assumed independent of the remaining 
alternatives, known as the “independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)” property.  This becomes a 
particular problem when the choices or outcomes are close substitutes for one another. Thus, in 
regard the IIA assumption for the MNL has been tested and above categories i.e., public private and 
State owned enterprises are based on this test. The results of these tests can be provided on request.   7 
education. Moreover, the rate of return is higher for the private sector as 
compared to the public sector, perhaps indicating the scarcity of educated people 
in the private sector.  
All the estimated effects for the regional categories are significant. 
Individuals in urban areas earn more then their rural counterpart. Balochistan is 
the highest earning state, as it is the omitted category and the rest of provinces 
effects are statistically significant from the base and posses negative signs. 
Marital status is insignificant in public sector but significant in private sector 
with a positive sign.  
The Table A-3 report respectively the estimates for stated job preference 
(using a univariate probit model) and unemployment duration (using an interval 
regression model).
7  The job preference model is relatively austere and includes 
the wage offer gap measure,
8 a set of regional effects, and a control for 
settlement type. The wage differential between the public and private sector is 
used as an independent variable in the probit model for public sector job 
preferences. For this purpose, first of all wages were predicted based on the 
wage equations reported in Table A -5 for all the individuals. Then, this 
difference between the public and private pay for the unemployed is included in 
the public sector job preference model. The estimated effect for the wage offer 
differential is poorly determined and suggests wage differences appear 
unimportant in determining the public sector job preferences of the unemployed. 
This suggests that the preference for a public sector job is perhaps influenced 
more by fringe-benefits and work conditions than by wage rates.  For example, 
the most pronounced issues for preference for a public sector is working hours. 
The public sector is committed to providing workers with reasonable hours of 
work, which must not exceed 48 hours per week. Workers must be provided 
with at least one day off in each seven-day period. Overtime work is a key issue 
for many enterprises, due to tight deadlines imposed by buyers, and the need to 
accommodate rush orders. This need must be balanced against the right of 
workers to choose whether or not they wish to work overtime (unless some 
mandatory arrangements for overtime have been included in a legally binding 
collective agreement), and their right to receive premium rates for overtime 
hours worked.  
Protection in the form of annual leave, sick leave, and special leave is 
determined by law in the public sector. Labour protection issues including 
protection against hazards in the work place, issues of work safety as well as 
protection from work related diseases and illness are considered important in the 
government sector jobs.  Social security that  includes protection against the 
                                                 
7The limited set of variables reported in the duration equation are those that registered either 
statistical significance or close to it.   
8The effects of age, gender, marital status, and human capital effects on job preferences are 
assumed captured through the wage differential measure.   8 
effects of economic and social hardship resulting from a reduction in earnings 
due to work accidents, work illness, unemployment, or retirement is another 
main benefit that workers can enjoy while being in the public sector.  
The workers in the public sector job receive pensions and many other 
benefits like free medical care and loans with negligible rate of interest even 
after retirement. All these issues make the public sector jobs more attractive then 
the private sector job. In terms of non-wage benefits private sector in Pakistan is 
flourishing now and many private firms are offering attractive pay packages. 
However, because of these above described attractive non-wage features of the 
public sector people are more likely to prefer public sector jobs.  These factors 
are viewed as more important than wages, hence the statistical insignificance of 
the wage in the preference equation. 
The separate effect of provincial and urban/rural categories is important 
while exploring the public sector job preference because the government sector 
jobs are announced particularly with the quota for residents of all the provinces. 
The quota is usually announced according to the population of every province 
with its urban rural areas. Based on this formula a particular number of jobs are 
allocated for provincial quota and rest of the jobs are on merit. The highest 
number of jobs in different announced jobs is allocated to Punjab as it is most 
highly populated province. Then come Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, 
respectively. The unemployed residents in urban areas are, on average and 
ceteris paribus, almost eight percentage points more likely to state a preference 
for the public sector job.  In addition, there is also a substantial variation in the 
public sector job preferences across regions with those in either Punjab or Sindh 
less inclined towards government jobs compared to the Baloch reference group.  
The estimates for the unemployment duration model reveal a strong role 
for education. The higher the level of education, the longer the reported 
uncompleted unemployment spell and the relationship appears to be monotonic. 
Those with a university degree report being unemployed for almost four months 
more relative to those without any formal education, on average and ceteris 
paribus.  An unemployed head of household reports a lower unemployment 
duration than a non-head.  This suggests that, controlling for the reported 
characteristics; family  responsibilities (perhaps capturing risk-aversion) 
motivate an individual to take the earliest acceptable job offer. Another main 
reason for this is the absence of formal social security system (i.e., no 
unemployment benefits).  
The stated preference public sector job variable enters the duration 
equation exogenously in this specification.  The estimated effect is well 
determined and sizeable in magnitude.  It suggests that those with a preference 
for a public sector job, controlling for education and other factors, have 
significantly higher uncompleted unemployment durations than those without 
such a preference.  This could be interpreted as consistent with the notion that   9 
such individuals are in a state of wait unemployment and are prepared to 
consider long periods of unemployment to satisfy their stated job preference. 
This provides some tentative evidence for the existence of a public sector job 
queue in Pakistan. Another important variable that may be important to 
determine the duration of unemployment i s household income that is not 
available in the data set. 
It might be interesting to explore why these unemployed individuals 
prefer to be in the queue to get a public sector job, why they don’t take a private 
sector job for this short period of time on a temporary basis. First of all, most of 
the individuals in this category have university degree or with higher education, 
they might have high expectation to get a public-sector job. Among these 
unemployed individuals 86 percent are male. They might want to spend this 
time for job search and may want to enter in a job for their life time career.  
Another important thing is that the mean age of this unemployed group 
with public sector preference is 24 years. According to cultural and family 
system in Pakistan, at this age usually individuals either male or female (married 
or unmarried) are living with their parents so they can afford to wait until they 
get some public sector job according to their expectations. Another important 
feature of this unemployed class is that almost 77 percent are singles and only 
23 percent are married. Thus singles may be free from their household financial 
responsibilities and can afford to wait for a public sector job. Moreover almost 
88 percent of this unemployed class with public sector job preference is living in 
the present district since birth. Since the individuals have been living at the same 
place for a long period of time, they are well settled and can afford to be 
unemployed for the period of job search. A potential of our approach, is the 
issue of the uncompleted duration of unemployment. This is due to lack of 
information in our data set. Thus, we are unaware for how long these individuals 
remain unemployed. A panel data study might be more useful for such analysis 
that this is currently not available in Pakistan.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The study used the stated preferences for public sector jobs among the 
unemployed to inform on the existence of public sector job queues in Pakistan.  
The more substantive contribution of the paper lies it what it reveals 
about the relationship between job preferences and unemployment duration in 
Pakistan. The potential wage advantage an unemployed individual would enjoy 
in a public sector job exerted no independent influence on the stated preference, 
perhaps suggesting that fringe benefits and work conditions are more important 
considerations.  However, there was some regional variation in stated job 
preferences and those residing in urban areas were more likely to indicate a 
preference for a public sector job than those in rural areas.  This may reflect the 
greater availability of such jobs in urban areas.            10 
A small number of variables were found to influence uncompleted 
unemployment durations.  The turnover within the unemployed among 
household heads appears high and may be taken to reflect their risk-aversion 
given greater family responsibilities.  However, the key driver for turnover was 
education level and the monotonic nature of the relationship suggested that the 
more educated tend to engage in wait unemployment as they conduct job search.  
For instance, an unemployed individual with a university degree had 4.1 months 
higher uncompleted duration than someone with no formal education, on 
average and ceteris paribus.  The stated preference for a public sector job is also 
associated with higher uncompleted durations.  The estimated effect suggests 
that, on average and controlling for education and other characteristics, the 
unemployed who stated a preference for public sector jobs have higher 
uncompleted durations by close to four months. The point estimate rises to well 
over six months when the stated preference measure is treated endogenously.  
This could be taken to confirm that there are queues for public sector jobs in 
Pakistan and that they are lengthy. 
I acknowledge that use of uncompleted durations provides an incomplete 
portrait of the phenomenon investigated here.  If individuals hold out for a 
public sector job, the completed unemployment durations may be considerably 
higher and our  estimates could be taken to provide an under-estimate of the 
effect.  In addition, the preferences for a public sector job may be influenced by 
the duration of unemployment experienced. This is recognised as plausible but 
its modelling provides an added complication and is not pursued here, thus 
recommended for further investigation.           
   11 
Table A-1 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable   Description 
Job Preference  =1 if 1 if the individual expresses a preference for a public sector job; 
= 0 otherwise.  
Unemployment Duration  This is an interval coded variable where: 
   DUR_1  Unemployment Duration < One month. 
   DUR_2  One month  = Unemployment Duration < two months. 
   DUR_3  two months  = Unemployment Duration < seven months. 
   DUR_4  seven months = Unemployment Duration < twelve months. 
   DUR_5  Unemployment Duration = twelve months.   
   Since Birth  =1 if the individual was born in the district they currently reside in; 
= 0 otherwise.  
Male  = 1 if the individual is male; 0 = female. 
Age   The age of the respondent expressed in years. 
Head  =1 if the individual is the head of household; = 0 otherwise.  
NFE  =1 if the individual has no formal educational qualifications; 
= 0 otherwise.  
Primary  =1 if the individual’s highest qualification is to primary level (five 
years of education); = 0 otherwise.  
Middle   =1 if the individual’s highest qualification is to middle level (eight 
years of education); = 0 otherwise. 
Matriculation  =1 if the individual’s highest qualification is to matriculation (ten years 
of education); = 0 otherwise. 
Intermediate  =1 if the individual’s highest qualification is to two years of college 
(twelve years of education); = 0 otherwise. 
Degree  =1 if the individual’s highest qualification is a university degree 
(including professional and postgraduate); = 0 otherwise. 
Train   
Urban  =1 if the individual resides in an urban area; = 0 otherwise.  
Balochistan  =1 if the individual resides in Baloch; = 0 otherwise.  
Punjab  =1 if the individual resides in Punjab; = 0 otherwise.  
Sindh  =1 if the individual resides in Sindh; = 0 otherwise.  
NWFP  =1 if the individual resides in the North-West Frontier Province; 
= 0 otherwise.  
Married  =1 if the individual is married; = 0 otherwise  
Wage Differential 
 
This is computed as  ] ˆ ˆ [ private public i X b - b ¢ where Xi denotes the vector 
of characteristics for the ith
 individual  and  j b ˆ denotes the vector of 
wage coefficients for the jth
 sector where j=public, private reported in 
Table A3.   
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Table A-2 








Job Preference     0.452  1.000  0.000 
Unemployment Duration       
DUR_1      0.139  0.078  0.190 
DUR_2      0.249  0.182  0.305 
DUR_3      0.206  0.179  0.229 
DUR_4      0.136  0.133  0.138 
DUR_5      0.270  0.429  0.138 
Since Birth      0.869  0.876  0.864 
Male      0.893  0.859  0.921 
Age    26.186 





Head     0.206  0.130  0.269 
NFE
†     0.203  0.084  0.300 
Primary     0.172  0.104  0.229 
Middle      0.164  0.127  0.195 
Matriculation     0.229  0.317  0.157 
Intermediate     0.103  0.158  0.057 
Degree     0.129  0.210  0.062 
Train     0.043  0.049  0.038 
Urban     0.516  0.550  0.488 
Balochistan
†     0.079  0.095  0.064 
Punjab     0.400  0.363  0.431 
Sindh     0.159  0.141  0.174 
NWFP     0.362  0.401  0.331 





    
   0.318 
  (0.154) 












Sample Size  767  347  420 
Notes: to Table A-2. 
(a) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables.   
(b) † Denotes omitted category in estimation. 
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Table A-3 
Job Preference and Unemployment Duration Models 
  Separate Stated Job Preference and Unemployment Duration 
Equations with Stated Job Preference as Exogenous Regressor 
  Stated Job Preference  Unemployment Duration 




Since Birth     ‡  –0.988 
(0.764) 
Head     ‡  –1.836*** 
(0.649) 
Primary     ‡   1.108 
(0.828) 
Middle     ‡   1.442* 
(0.842) 
Matric.     ‡   2.996*** 
(0.814) 
Intermediate     ‡   3.213*** 
(1.018) 
Degree     ‡   4.130** 
(0.959) 
Job Preference
9     ‡   3.596*** 
(0.565) 
Wage Differential  –0.207 
(0.325 ) 
   ‡ 
Urban   0.194** 
(0.094) 
   ‡ 
Punjab  –0.297** 
(0.189) 
   ‡ 
Sindh  –0.390*  
(0.201) 
   ‡ 
NWFP  –0.073 
(0.182) 
   ‡ 
S  1.0   6.536*** 
(0.244) 
N  767  767 
Log(L)  –21.6  –1362.4 
Notes: to Table A-3. 
(a) The estimates in column one are based on estimation of a univariate probit model. 
(b) The estimates in column two are based on the estimation of an interval regression model.  
(c)  ‡ denotes not used in estimation. 
(d)  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively using 
two tailed tests. 
 
                                                 
9Our approach  allowed “Job Preference” to enter in the unemployment duration model 
exogenously after applying Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The results of this test can be provided on request.   14 
Table A-4 
OLS Wage Equation Estimates for Sectoral Equations 
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‡  ‡ 




‡  ‡  ‡  ‡ 
N  3310  3694  3310  3694  3310  3694 
s  ‡  ‡  0.464  0.577  0.464  0.577 
Adjusted R
2  ‡  ‡  0.386  0.337  0.386  0.337 
Notes: to Table A-4. 
(a)  A five-category multinomial logit model was used to compute the Lee selection terms.  
(b)   ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively using 
two tailed tests. 
(c) ‡ Denotes not applicable. 
   15 
Table A-5 
Public Sector Wage Differentials 
Based on  Unconditional  Conditional 












Notes: to Table A-5. 
(a)  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively using 
two tailed tests. 
(b) The unconditional differentials are based on the selectivity corrected estimates from Table A-
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 Table A-6  
Multinomial Logit Results 
 
Notes:  (a) The omitted category is unemployed and do not want to participate in the labour market.  
(b) ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively using two tailed 
tests. 
(c) However in approaching the problem i.e., for prediction of wages for unemployed individuals, wage 
equations are estimated only for public and private sector. 
 







(Std. error)  z 
Coefficient 
(Std. error)  z 
Coefficient 
(Std. error)  z 
Coefficient 
(Std. error)  z 
Urban 
–0.0509 








(0.0825)  –0.81 
Sindh 
–0.0001 































































































































(0.2077)  1.11 
0.0147 






















(0.2322)  1.04 
0.0253 



















































Number of Obs   =      41563 
LR Chi2(64)     =   24953.39 
Prob > Chi2     =     0.0000 
Log Likelihood = –16835.085        
Pseudo R
2       =     0.4257   17 
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